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Police officers, firefighters, and EMTs responding to emergencies often operate their vehicles under circumstances far different from everyday motorists. 
While New York law recognizes this reality by affording emergency vehicles certain privileges, questions often arise about when those privileges apply and what standard of care governs if an accident occurs. A recent decision from the Appellate Division, Second Department — Begum v. Marzullo (2025 NY Slip Op 04621) — highlights the importance of properly identifying the governing standard when litigating collisions involving emergency vehicles.
In Begum, the plaintiff sought summary judgment after her vehicle collided with a marked Suffolk County police car. The accident occurred in an intersection while the officer was engaged in official duties. Plaintiff’s theory was straightforward: she claimed the officer violated standard traffic laws and was therefore negligent as a matter of law. On that basis, she moved for summary judgment on liability.
The second department, however, affirmed the lower court’s denial of her motion. The court reasoned that plaintiff’s moving papers failed to resolve critical threshold questions about whether the officer was engaged in an “emergency operation” and whether the conduct at issue fell within the categories of privileged actions recognized by statute. Without establishing those points, the court explained, the plaintiff could not demonstrate as a matter of law which standard of care — ordinary negligence or the more demanding reckless-disregard — test controlled the case.
New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 authorizes operators of emergency vehicles, when involved in an emergency operation, to disregard certain traffic rules such as speed limits, stop signals, and directional restrictions, provided they do so with due regard for the safety of others. Subdivision (e) of that statute further provides that when an accident arises from the exercise of these privileges, liability will not attach unless the driver acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Courts have long held that reckless disregard is a significantly higher threshold than ordinary negligence, requiring proof of conscious indifference to a known or obvious risk that makes harm highly probable.
Against this statutory backdrop, the court in Begum held that plaintiff’s submissions were insufficient. First, the plaintiff did not establish that the officer was not engaged in an emergency operation, a finding that would have left only ordinary negligence as the applicable standard. Nor did plaintiff prove that the officer’s driving was not one of the enumerated privileges, which, if shown, would trigger the reckless-disregard test. Second, even assuming the heightened standard applied, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing that the officer’s conduct rose to the level of recklessness as a matter of law. Because these fundamental questions remained unanswered, the court concluded that plaintiff had not made the required prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 
Ultimately, Begum leaves the factfinder to determine whether the officer’s conduct in the intersection amounted to a failure to exercise reasonable care or, if statutory privileges applied, whether it rose to reckless disregard. Either way, the decision reflects the judiciary’s continued insistence on a precise application of the Vehicle and Traffic Law when balancing the need for emergency responders to act swiftly with the public’s right to roadway safety.
Scott Richman is the principal of Richman Law Firm, which handles business and commercial litigation, personal injury and real estate disputes, and class actions. Jenny Adams, an associate at the firm, assisted in the preparation of this article.
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